Augustine of Hippo

Paul must receive, embrace and observe, without any reserve, those commandments of the law which help to form the character of the faithful, such as that “denying ungodliness and worldly desires, we should live soberly and justly and godly in this world” and “Thou shalt not covet,” chosen by the apostle as the part of the law worthy of the greatest commendation; and also the commandments about loving God and our neighbor, as set forth in the law without any figure or mystery.… But whatever progress he makes in them he must not attribute it to himself but to “the grace of God by Jesus Christ our Lord.” Letters 196.2.8.Fulgentius of Ruspe: The apostle Paul exclaims in a similar way: “Be imitators of God as his dear children.” What will we reply to these words, brethren, or what excuse will we be able to have? If someone tells you that you should imitate the powers which our Lord exercised, there is a reasonable excuse for you, because not everyone is given the grace to exercise those powers and to work miracles. But to live piously and chastely, to preserve charity with all men, with God’s help is possible for everyone.

Free will and God’s grace are simultaneously commended. When God says, “Turn to me, and I will turn to you,” one of these clauses—that which invites our return to God—evidently belongs to our will; while the other, which promises his return to us, belongs to his grace. Here, possibly, the Pelagians think they have justification for their opinion, which they so prominently advance, that God’s grace is given according to our merits. In the east, indeed, that is to say, in the province of Palestine, in which is the city of Jerusalem, Pelagius, when examined in person by the bishop, did not venture to affirm this. For it happened that among the objections which were brought up against him, this in particular was objected, that he maintained that the grace of God is given according to our merits, an opinion which was so diverse from Catholic doctrine and so hostile to the grace of Christ that unless he had anathemized it, as laid to his charge, he himself must have been anathemized on its account. He pronounced, indeed, the required anathema upon the dogm;a, but how insincerely his later books plainly show; for in them he maintains absolutely no other opinion than that the grace of God is given according to our merits. Such passages do they collect out of the Scriptures—like the one which I just now quoted, “Turn to me, and I will turn to you”—as if it were owing to the merits of our turning to God that his grace were given us, wherein he himself even turns to us. Now the persons who hold this opinion fail to observe that unless our turning to God were itself God’s gift, it would not be said to him in prayer, “Turn us again, O God of hosts,” and, “You, O God, will turn and quicken us,” and again, “Turn us, O God of our salvation”—with other passages of similar import, too numerous to mention here. For with respect to our coming to Christ, what else does it mean than our being turned to him by believing? And yet he says, “No man can come to me, except it were given to him of my Father.”

Likewise, who will tell with what bodies angels appear to people, in such fashion as not to be visible but to be tangible? And again how, not through tangible corporeality but by spiritual power, angels produce certain visions, not to the eyes of the body but to those of the spirit or the mind, or can utter speech, not of the ear from without, but within the soul of humans, being themselves placed there, as is written in the book of the prophets: “And the angel that spoke in me said to me” (for what the prophet says is not “that spoke to me,” but “in me”).… They appear also in sleep and speak through dreams (for we read in the Gospel: “Behold, an angel of the Lord appeared to him in a dream, saying”). These methods of communication tend to show that the angels have intangible bodies, and make it a very difficult question how the patriarchs could wash the feet of angels, and how Jacob could wrestle with an angel in contact so unmistakable. Asking these questions and answering them with such guesses as we can is not a useless exercise for the mind, if the discussion is kept within bounds and if those who take part avoid the error of thinking they know what they do not know. For what need is there of affirming or denying or making nice distinctions about these and similar matters, when ignorance of them imputes no blame?

Another example to prove the same point may be found in a passage of Zechariah where the “Almighty” sends the “Almighty.” This can only mean that God the Father sends God the Son. The text runs, “So says the Lord Almighty: ‘After the glory he has sent me to the nations that have robbed you; for he that touches you touches the apple of my eye. For behold, I lift up my head upon them, and they shall be a prey to those who served them; and you shall know that the Lord almighty sent me.’ ” In this case, the Lord almighty says that he is sent by the Lord almighty. How can anyone doubt that it is Christ who is speaking and, in fact, speaking to the lost sheep of the house of Israel? Remember what is said in the Gospel: “I was not sent except to the lost sheep of the house of Israel.” The comparison of these lost sheep to the apple of God’s eye is explained by the perfection of God’s love. And, of course, it was to this flock of sheep that the apostles belonged. “After the glory” of his resurrection—a glory alluded to in the words “Jesus had not yet been glorified”3—it was in the person of these apostles that Jesus was sent to the Gentiles. And this was to be the fulfillment of what the psalmist had prophesied: “You will deliver me from the contradictions of the people; you will make me head of the Gentiles.”

As to the suggestion you made in your letter that we should examine together the nature of an oath extorted by force, I beg of you, do not let our discussion turn crystal-clear matters into murky ones. If a servant of God were threatened with certain death, so that he should swear to do something forbidden and wicked, he still ought rather to die than to swear, so as not to commit a crime in fulfilling his oath. But in this case, … it was only the persistent shouting of the people that was forcing the man not to any crime but to what could be lawfully done, if it were done. And … the only thing to fear was that a few violent men, mingled with a crowd of mostly good ones, might seize the occasion to start a riot, under pretence of virtuous indignation, and might break out into some accursed disturbance to satisfy their passion for robbery. And when even this fear was unfounded, who would think that perjury could be committed even to avoid certain death, much less loss or some kind of physical injury? That individual called Regulus had never heard what the holy Scriptures say about the wrongfulness of a false oath. He had learned nothing about the sickle of Zechariah, and obviously he had not sworn to the Carthaginians by the sacraments of Christ but by the filthiness of demons. Yet he did not so fear certain torture and a horrible sort of death as to take his oath under compulsion, but he went to meet them to avoid perjuring himself, because he had sworn on oath of his own free will.